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ABSTRACT 
  
This paper argues through a close reading of Alasdair Macintyre’s works on justice and rationality 
that his reflections on the matter, despite their initial anti-liberal and foundationalist intent, have 
led him to endorse something close to an anti-foundationalist liberal position like that emerging 
from the works of neo-pragmatists philosophers such Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam and John 
Rawls. 
This is a position that regards rationality as internal to traditions, without taking this as a reason 
for thinking that we are irrationally trapped within the boundaries traced by the norms and 
standards of our own traditions. Instead, it regards us as able to transcend those boundaries 
through a conversational and fallibilistic use of reason, which makes us ready to revise our 
conceptual and evaluative horizons through open confrontation with other traditions.  
In order to illustrate this contention, the paper will have to disentangle the irresolvable and 
overlapping tensions between foundationalist and anti-foundationalist inclinations, and between 
anti-liberal and liberal ones, that deeply permeate his thought. 
  
  
0. Introduction 
  
In this paper I shall show how the reflections on rationality and justice that Alasdair 
Macintyre has been presenting over the last twenty years or so since the publication 
of After Virtue have eventually led him, despite their initial anti-liberal and 
foundationalist intent, to endorse something close to an anti-foundationalist liberal 
position like that emerging from the works of neo-pragmatists philosophers such 
Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam and John Rawls. This position regards rationality as 
internal to traditions, without taking this as a reason for thinking that we are 
irrationally trapped within the boundaries traced by the norms and standards of our 
own traditions. Instead, it regards us as able to transcend those boundaries through 
a conversational and fallibilistic use of reason, which makes us ready to revise our 
conceptual and evaluative horizons through open confrontation with other 
traditions. That is to say, a position that regards liberal reasonableness, centred on a 
commitment to what Rawls calls ‘the principle of reciprocity’, as the virtue enabling 
us to overcome the possible defects and limitations of ethnocentric rationality. 
I take it that Macintyre would still regard himself as being neither an anti-
foundationalist without reserve, nor especially a liberal; in fact the principal targets 
of his investigations into rationality and justice still seem to be anti-foundationalism 
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and liberalism. Yet this should not prevent us from seeing anti-foundational 
liberalism as the ultimate outcome of his reflections, because not only do these fail 
to match his foundationalist and anti-liberal expectations but, moreover, they are 
imbued throughout their development, and especially more recently, with more or 
less explicit anti-foundationalist and liberal elements. Indeed, irresolvable and 
overlapping tensions between foundationalist and anti-foundationalist inclinations, 
and between anti-liberal and liberal ones, turn out to deeply permeate his thought. 
The best way to proceed to prove my contention is to focus on Macintyre’s attempt 
to overcome what he takes to be the relativist predicament, trying to disentangle the 
import of what he actually says rationality to consist of from what he believes his 
conception of rationality would enable us to account for. We will see in fact that 
although Macintyre’s idea of the pitfalls of the relativist predicament, and thus of an 
adequate conception of rationality, points towards a metaphysical and conservative 
framework of thought, his positive account of the character of rational enquiry, 
despite of what he might think, converges substantially with Rawls, Rorty and 
Putnam’s ethnocentrism and their allegiance to a liberal conception of rationality as 
reasonableness, as readiness to listen to others regarded as free and equal persons, 
and willingness to propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation. Yet, before 
looking at his most recent reflections on relativism and truth it is expedient to begin 
by showing the weakness of the main contentions and arguments advanced in After 
Virtue, the work in which Macintyre’s anti-liberal anti-anti-foundationalist stance 
has been first systematically presented and where it is most manifest. 
  
  
1. After Virtue: a conservative solution to the failure of foundationalism 
  
After Virtue starts with the following thought experiment:  
  
Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A series 
of environmental disasters are blamed by the general public on the scientists. 
Widespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books 
and instruments are destroyed. Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes 
power and successfully abolishes science teaching and universities, imprisoning and 
executing the remaining scientists. Later still there is a reaction against this 
destructive movement and enlightened people seek to revive science, although they 
have largely forgotten what it was. But all that they possess are fragments… 
Nonetheless all these fragments are reembodied in a set of practices which go 
under the name of the revived names of physics, chemistry and biology… Nobody, 
or almost nobody, realizes that what they are doing is not natural science in a 
proper sense at all… In such a culture men would use expressions such as 
‘neutrino’, ‘mass’, ‘specific gravity…but many of the beliefs presupposed by the use 
of these expressions would have been lost and there would appear to be an element 
of arbitrariness and even of choice in their application which would appear very 
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surprising to us. What would appear to be rival and competing premises for which 
no further argument could be given would abound. Subjectivist theories of science 
would appear and would be criticized by those who held that the notion of truth 
embodied in what they took to be science was incompatible with subjectivism.(1) 
  
The main contention of the book is that ‘in the actual world in which we inhabit the 
language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural 
science in the imaginary world.’(2) Symptoms of this moral disorder in the 
contemporary Western world would be two contrasting characteristics of our moral 
and political debates. The first is their ‘interminability’, due to ‘the conceptual 
incommensurability of the rival arguments’, which makes any such debate ‘a matter 
of pure assertion and counter-assertion’, ‘a clash of antagonist wills’, and any 
commitment to a particular position a matter of ‘disquieting private arbitrariness.’ 
The second, contrasting, characteristic is that, despite their incommensurability, 
these arguments ‘purport to be impersonal arguments’, they use expressions which 
‘purport to appeal to objective standards’, thus suggesting ‘that the practice of moral 
argument in our culture expresses at least an inspiration to be or become rational in 
this area of our lives.’(3) This latter characteristic, according to Macintyre, would 
point to the existence of a past world in which moral and political debate was 
rationally settable and terminable. The former would show instead that in the 
contemporary world ‘all grasp of any objective and impersonal criteria has been 
lost.’(4) 
Macintyre’s principal intent in After Virtue is to trace the history of this ‘moral 
decline’, to individuate the equivalent catastrophic event of his thought experiment 
that in the real world has disrupted and caused the loss of unity and objectivity of 
moral and political discourse and has brought about all those anti-foundationalist 
conceptions, like emotivism (the particular target of his criticisms(5)), that make 
incommensurability and rational interminability characteristics of all normative 
discourse, whose eliminability cannot be a priori guaranteed. His conviction is that 
this is a history that developed through three main distinct stages:  
  
a first at which evaluative and more especially moral theory and practice embody 
genuine objective and impersonal standards which provide rational justification for 
particular policies, actions and judgments, and which themselves in turn are 
susceptible of rational justification; a second stage at which there are unsuccessful 
attempts to maintain the objectivity and impersonality of moral judgments, but 
during which the project of providing rational justifications by means of and for the 
standards continuously breaks down; and a third stage at which theories of an 
emotivist kind secure wide implicit acceptance because a general implicit 
recognition in practice that claims to objectivity and impersonality cannot be made 
good.(6) 
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These then are the main claims to establishing which the reflections contained in 
After Virtue are devoted: there was a time and a culture in which moral theory and 
practice were regulated by rationally justified objective and impersonal standards of 
rationality; something happened in the course of human history that caused the 
disappearance of the necessary social and conceptual preconditions for the 
knowledge of those standards and thus of moral truth, and consequently caused the 
rise of anti-foundationalist theories and practices; that disappearance and the 
consequent appearance of those relativist theories and practices represents “a grave 
cultural loss.”  
It is my conviction that Macintyre’s arguments fail in all three respects. The 
principal reason is that those arguments stand on a metaphysical conception of 
moral objectivity of which he never shows the viability. In particular, Macintyre fails 
to show the objectivity of the moral discourse of the lost culture in a sense of 
‘objectivity’ which is not available to anti-foundationalists to appeal to, and which 
thus could justify his contention that an emotivist culture, like the one he believes 
the liberal one to be, would be in a state of grave moral disorder in comparison 
with certain pre-Enlightenment cultures. I therefore think that, if Macintyre wishes 
to make his contention good, he should not resort to epistemological arguments, 
but rather to moral and political ones. I think, that is, that the only way to take his 
opposition to the moral discourse of contemporary Western culture seriously is to 
read behind his epistemologically couched considerations a moral and political 
opposition to liberal culture. But, as we shall see, it is exactly when we try to get 
hold of the content of his moral and political stance that the tensions in Macintyre’s 
thought come to the fore and reach irremediable intensity. In order to illustrate this 
let us start by seeing what, according to Macintyre, are the key episodes in social 
history which provoked the loss of the conceptual and social preconditions for the 
objectivity and impersonality of moral judgements, and thus brought about 
contemporary anti-foundationalists theories and practices. 
These he believes to be ‘episodes in the history of philosophy.’ It has been the 
breakdown of the eighteenth-century empiricist and rationalist foundationalist 
attempts at grounding morality – either on passions (like Hume) or on reason (like 
Kant) – which had been perceived first by Kierkegaard, and then most 
perspicuously by Nietzsche, that, according to Macintyre, ‘provided the historical 
background of our emotivist culture.(7) The crucial point for Macintyre is that 
those attempts at grounding morality failed, not because of the inability of their 
promoters to reach the right conception of human nature and formulate sound 
arguments, but because they were ‘bound to fail.’ Macintyre believes that all those 
eighteenth-century philosophers deprived themselves of the necessary precondition 
for their success, as ‘they all rejected any teleological view of human nature, any 
view of man as having an essence which defines his true end.’ It is this elimination 
of any notion of ‘man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos’ – ‘joint effect of the 
secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and 
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philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism’(8) – that is the catastrophic event that 
would have provoked the disappearance and forgetfulness of the preconditions for 
moral objectivity, and consequently the degeneration of contemporary moral 
thought and practices. 
According to Macintyre, in fact, objectivity in ethics is possible only within the 
Aristotelian and theological teleological scheme of moral reasoning and practice 
based on a functional conception of a human being as having an essential purpose, 
function or telos, and on the consequent contrast between ‘man-as-he-happens-to-
be’ and ‘man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.’ This is because ‘the 
whole point of ethics – both as a theoretical and practical discipline – is to enable 
man to pass from his present state to his true ends’(9), and because it is only once 
we know what these true ends are, what the essential purpose of human beings is, 
that ‘evaluative statements can be called true or false in precisely the way in which 
all other factual statements can be so called.’(10) For to call x good is simply to say 
‘that it is the kind of x which someone would choose who wanted an x for the 
purpose for which x’s are characteristically wanted’(11), and knowing the essential 
purpose of human beings we would know what they are characteristically wanted 
for, and thus when an evaluative statement would be true, in exactly the same way 
that we would know when a factual statement is. 
The eighteenth-century philosophers’ project of finding a rational basis for their 
moral beliefs and practices therefore had to fail, because, by abandoning any 
functional conception of human nature and any account of human telos, they 
opened an unbridgeable gap between moral injunctions and human nature, thereby 
depriving themselves of the only justificatory ground for moral rules and 
precepts.(12) That gap is the same one that modern philosophers themselves 
started, beginning with Hume, to observe separating factual from normative 
statements. The conviction that there is no deriving ‘ought’ conclusions from ‘is’ 
premises became indeed characteristic of their (and then our) moral philosophies, 
thus constituting for Macintyre ‘an epitaph to their entire project.’(13) 
I do agree that the recognition of the ‘is-ought’ divide was the ultimate fatal blow 
inflicted on Enlightenment foundationalism. But there is a crucial question which 
Macintyre remains constantly blind to: Did not the recognition of that divide show 
the bankruptcy of Aristotelian and theological teleology too? From a different 
angle: Were not those eighteenth-century foundationalist attempts, of which 
Macintyre so accurately shows the unavoidable failure, the last desperate attempts 
to save the conviction in, and the practices of, moral objectivity after the bankruptcy 
of Aristotelian and theological teleology? 
In order to appreciate why we should answer these questions in the affirmative, and 
thus why Macintyre’s main contention that the Enlightenment’s loss of the 
precondition of moral objectivity is a grave cultural and moral loss does not stand 
up to close scrutiny, we need to stress a crucial, and by now familiar, distinction 
which Macintyre regularly ignores. The distinction we need to have clear is that 
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between an externalist way of understanding the Humean “no ‘ought’ from ‘is’ 
thesis” and an internalist way. The former way of intending it is the sense in which 
anti-foundationalists believe that thesis to be true and in which it constitutes the 
epitaph to foundationalism. In this sense the thesis reads as claiming that no 
normative judgements can be derived from metaphysical facts; that is, that there is 
no metaphysical grounding for normativity. Read in this way the Humean thesis 
constitutes an epitaph to Aristotelian and theological teleology too, since those 
kinds of teleology were metaphysical ones. Yet, what we need to consider is that 
anti-foundationalism is only against foundational teleology and not against teleology 
per se. Anti-foundationalists do not deny that we can derive normative judgements 
from factual statements, that ‘we can call evaluative statements true or false in 
precisely the way in which all other factual statements can be so called’, once we 
speak from within a particular ethnocentric conception of the human nature and 
human telos. When read in this internalist/ethnocnetric way anti-foundationalists 
believe the no ‘ought’ from ‘is’ thesis to be false. In fact, as Rorty and Putnam have 
showed us, anti-foundationalism does not need to abandon any notion of ‘truth’ but 
only metaphysical (externalist) ones. So, equally it does not need to abandon any 
notion of ‘human nature’ and of ‘human telos’, but can instead retain them with 
clear conscience once they are intended as referring to a particular ethnocentric 
conception of ‘the function of human beings’ as opposed to a metaphysical one. 
Once such a particular conception ‘of the purpose for which x’s (human beings) are 
characteristically wanted’ is in place, of course, we can confidently call true or false 
our moral judgements, for we possess a criterion of moral truth; but this objectivity 
of the moral discourse remains ethnocentric, because the purpose we think of as 
being characteristic of human beings is not metaphysically characteristic of them, 
but only expresses what we think, from our ungrounded set of always revisable 
values and beliefs, a life worth living consist of. 
The point I want to make, then, is that in order for Macintyre’s argument for the 
loss of moral objectivity in an anti-foundationalist culture to work he has to be 
referring to a metaphysical sense of objectivity, and therefore to a metaphysical 
sense of teleology, as this is the only sense of teleology that could support 
metaphysical objectivity and that could not be accounted for by an anti-
foundationalist culture.(14) Yet, this sense of objectivity is exactly the same one that 
the eighteenth-century empiricist and rationalist philosophers attempted, but failed 
to restore in their moral beliefs and practices after they recognised the failure of the 
Aristotelian and theological attempts to guarantee it. 
Of course, Macintyre does not believe in the bankruptcy of Aristotelian and 
theological metaphysical teleology, nor does he believe in the impossibility of 
metaphysical objectivity. But he never argues for these convictions. He never gives 
an example of really true Aristotelian or theological teleology, the only Aristotelian 
and theological teleology that could guarantee to a culture a moral order based on 
metaphysically objective and impersonal standards. He never even shows us how to 
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arrive at a true Aristotelian or theological teleology could ever be possible; indeed 
he never shows us how metaphysical objectivity, and thus metaphysical theology in 
general, is possible. His only argument for the possibility of metaphysical objectivity 
consists in the mere statement of the reference of our moral claims to objective and 
impersonal standards (what Macintyre regards as the second characteristic of 
contemporary moral discourse). Though, as Rorty and Putnam again have shown 
us, the objectivity and impersonality of our normative standards does not need to 
point beyond the whole of our beliefs and values, beyond practice tout court, but 
only beyond our actual beliefs, values and practices; and, therefore, does not need 
to speak for metaphysical objectivity, the one Macintyre must stick to if he wants to 
make good his case for the moral degeneration of contemporary culture.(15) 
Besides, it would not even work for Macintyre to specify that when he is saying that 
people refer to impersonal and objective standards he is meaning that they intend 
to refer to metaphysically impersonal and objective standards, that is, it will not do 
to say that our moral discourse is still couched in foundational terms. (This is 
actually what Macintyre seems to be claiming – and indeed it is what he should be 
claiming if he wants to make his contention against anti-foundationalism good – 
unaware that he is contradicting in this way his central claim that contemporary 
culture is an emotivist one). This specification does not work either because of the 
consideration, crucial for the working of our normative notions, that to think that x 
is the case does not entail that it is really the case that x and, a fortiori, that to think 
that there is a metaphysical truth does not entail that there is really such a kind of 
truth. Though, this circular entailment is the only argument that Macintyre in After 
Virtue puts forward for metaphysical truth; and the same circularity, of course, we 
find in his assertion of the possibility of Aristotelian and theological metaphysical 
teleology. He just assumes it without offering any argument; and from this 
unjustified assumption he then goes on to accuse modern and contemporary 
philosophers of obscurantism for having abolished teleological thought, when what 
they actually did was simply to recognise the unviability of Aristotelian and 
theological attempts at grounding moral discourse. 
His overall argument seems then to boil down to the reasoning that, since only the 
objective truth of a certain conception of the human telos would guarantee the true 
objectivity of our moral claims, we should think in teleological terms if we do not 
want to condemn our moral discourses and lives to the nightmarish relativist 
situation of his thought-experiment; which is plainly a non-sequitur as, it not only 
overlooks the difference between foundational and anti-foundational teleology, but, 
in particular, takes for granted the possibility of realising the former, and thus the 
conviction that anti-foundationalism condemns us to a ‘disquieting arbitrariness’, to 
a disquieting relativism. Because of this metaphysical persuasion I believe that 
Macintyre fails to consider the idea that the abandonment of Aristotelian and 
theological teleological conceptions of the good came about exactly for the same 
reason that urged Nietzsche to abandon any foundationalist attempt altogether, 
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namely, that any attempt to ground our theories and practices on metaphysics had 
proved to go nowhere and thus to be only hypocritical attempts to eternalise, and 
sometimes justify the imposition of, one’s own contingent practices. That is, 
Macintyre fails to realise that his notion of ‘telos’ belongs to the same family of 
‘moral fictions’ to which he relegates all the central notions of Enlightenment 
foundationalism, like those of ‘rights’ and ‘utility’, since like those notions it 
‘purports to provide us with an objective and impersonal criterion but it does 
not.’(16) If we come to realise this we may then confidently say, with Macintyre 
himself, that ‘Nietzsche’s negative proposal to raze to the ground the 
[foundationalist] structures of inherited moral belief and argument…has a certain 
plausibility’, because, ‘the initial rejection of the moral tradition to which Aristotle’s 
teaching about the virtues is central’ did not, pace Macintyre, turn out ‘to be 
misconceived and mistaken.’(17)  
Of course, once again, Macintyre does not believe the Nietzschean rejection of 
metaphysical thought to be plausible. However, we are now in a position to see 
how the reasons for his anti-anti-foundationalist conviction must lie in the fact that 
he thinks that the plausibility of anti-foundationalism would be a ‘terrible’(18) and 
‘disquieting’(19) prospect, and not in an argument showing the correctness of 
foundationalism. It is, thus, by looking at the reasons behind these distressed 
remarks that we can come to a better understanding of the main motivations for his 
overall argument against the moral discourse of post-Enlightenment societies. 
One of these reasons is the familiar and typical foundationalist belief that by 
dropping metaphysical thought we deprive our judgements of their normative 
authority. This is the belief behind his conviction that only a metaphysical 
teleological scheme of thought could guarantee objectivity and impersonality to our 
moral and evaluative judgements. This conviction takes us to the irresolvable 
conflict between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism; and Macintyre never 
offers us an argument for the plausibility of foundationalist objectivity. It was 
actually by digging behind his foundationalist persuasion that we came to see how it 
stands on the belief of the undesirability of anti-foundationalism. 
What then are the ultimate reasons for thinking anti-foundationalism is a ‘terrible’ 
and ‘disquieting’ scenario? These are, although embedded in metaphysical and 
epistemological considerations and convictions, moral and political reasons. 
Indeed, very interestingly, they re-propose both the main reason behind post-
Nietzcheans and neo-Kantians criticisms of anti-foundational liberalism and the 
main reason behind Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor’s communitarians 
opposition to liberalism. That is, Macintyre shares both the metaphysical 
assumption, common to post-Nietzcheans anti-liberal anti-foundationalists such as 
Michael Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida, and neo-
Kantians liberal foundationalist such as Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas and Alan 
Gewirth, that ethnocentrism jeopardises the realisation of the liberal project, 
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thereby condemning us to a situation of oppressive social relations, and the 
conservative communitarian stance common to Sandel and Taylor. 
That the arguments of After Virtue stand on the former belief (which will keep a 
central position still in his later reflections) is made clear when Macintyre expresses 
his conviction that ‘the key to the social content of emotivism’ is ‘the fact that 
emotivism entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative 
and non-manipulative social relations.’(20) His conviction here is that the prospect 
of an anti-foundationalism culture is a disquieting one because such a culture would 
not be able to abide by Kant’s liberal precept to treat each other as ends and not as 
means to one’s own ends. Yet, we should ask: what does to treat someone as an 
end really mean? Macintyre himself gives us no possible better answer: 
  
To treat someone else as an end is to offer them what I take to be good reasons for 
acting in one way rather than another, but to leave it to them to evaluate those 
reasons. It is to be unwilling to influence another except by reasons which that 
other he or she judges to be good.(21) 
  
But then, why should the anti-foundationalist not be able to offer people what she 
considers the best reasons supporting her beliefs and courses of action? And, in 
particular, why should she not be able to leave people free to be ‘their own judges’? 
Indeed there is no reason why anti-foundationalists should not. No reason why the 
absence of a neutral standard of rationality should prevent one from respecting 
someone’s freedom, inducing her instead “to seek to make him or her an 
instrument of my purposes by adducing whatever influences or considerations will 
in fact be effective on this or that occasion.”(22) 
Macintyre here thinks, as he has written in a later paper, that “the argument against 
the tyrant and the argument against relativized predicates of truth and justification 
require the same premises”(23), thus showing that he shares with post-Nietzschean 
and neo-Kantian critics of anti-foundational liberalism the assumption that a proper 
defence of freedom and equality depends on the realization of 
foundationalism.(24) Yet Rorty and Putnam have shown at length that there is 
nothing preventing anti-foundationalists to be liberals, that they are not impeded in 
overcoming a situation of deaf assertion and counter-assertion where all that 
matters is to succeed in imposing one’s own will over others, that they can indeed 
overcome such a situation through the exercise of the virtue of reasonableness, that 
the only impediments to liberal behaviour and the only threats to liberal institutions 
are moral and political and not epistemological ones, that tyrants cannot be 
defeated by rational argument at all because they hold different moral premises, 
and that the only defences we may ever posses against them are all those possible 
concrete moral, political and practical initiatives of resistance we may find necessary 
and available to endorse on different concrete occasions. Plato, pace Macintyre, 
was once again wrong:(25) foundational philosophy is of no help to the defence 
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and improvement of our practices, and consequently anti-foundationalism is not an 
impediment or menace to them.(26) 
Indeed, it is foundationalism to represent a much more serious impediment and a 
threat to the respect of freedom and equality, as it tends far too easily to hide 
conservative and authoritarian conceptions and practices of the worthwhile life 
under its rhetoric of truth. And just such a conservative and authoritarian political 
stance – which seems to stand in blatant contradiction to the previous 
foundationalist intent of defending the liberal injunction of treating the others as 
ends in themselves – is the other motivation behind Macintyre’s teleological 
criticisms of anti-foundationalism, and behind his conviction that the realisation of 
an anti-foundationalist culture is a terrible and disquieting prospect. 
This political stance is given clear expression throughout the book, but it is 
particularly manifest in the belief that liberalism is the social counterpart of anti-
foundationalism – a belief that, as I have just noted, seems to be the opposite of the 
assumption behind his seemingly liberal fear that an anti-foundationalist culture is 
doomed to manipulative social relations, i.e. that a fuller respect of freedom and 
equality depends on the realisation of foundationalism. Macintyre believes in fact 
that “the democratization of moral agency”, the fact that “it is in the self and not in 
the social roles or practices that moral agency has to be located”(27) is a direct 
consequence of the anti-foundationalist conviction that “the self lacks any rational 
criteria”, which may result in the further conviction that “everything may be 
criticized from whatever standpoint the self has adopted, including the self’s choice 
of standpoint to adopt”(28), and thus in the idea that “it is in this capacity of the self 
to evade any necessary identification with any particular contingent state of affairs 
that…[must be] seen the essence of moral agency.”(29) It is this democratisation, 
which liberals see as precondition for the full respect of freedom and equality, the 
aspect of anti-foundationalism that Macintyre disapproves and fears as terrible and 
disquieting. 
Thus, he is distressed that anti-foundationalist autonomy from any necessary 
identification with any particular state of affairs 
  
is celebrated historically for the most part not as loss, but as self-congratulatory 
gain, as the emergence of the individual freed on the one hand from the social 
bonds of those constraining hierarchies which the modern world rejected at its 
birth and on the other hand from what modernity has taken to be the superstitions 
of teleology.(30) 
  
He is concerned that, 
  
What I have described in terms of a loss of traditional structure and content was 
seen by the most articulate of their [emotivists’] philosophical spokesmen as the 
achievement by the self of its proper autonomy. The self had been liberated from 
Macintyre’s Tensions 
 
 137
all those outmoded forms of social organization which had imprisoned it 
simultaneously within a belief in a theistic and teleological world order and within 
those hierarchical structures which attempted to legitimate themselves as part of 
such a world order.(31) 
  
Macintyre is distressed by this liberation from metaphysical authorities and their 
social embodiment because he regards as terrible and disquieting the fact that “the 
peculiarly modern self, the emotivist self, in acquiring sovereignty in its own realm 
lost its traditional boundaries provided by a social identity and a view of human life 
as ordered to a given end.”(32) He is preoccupied then because he holds the 
communitarian metaphysical belief that we possess a true nature and that there are 
true goals for our lives, which we should be true to, set for us once for all by the 
inherited practices and conceptions of the society that we happen to inhabit. This is 
the reason why he praises traditional metaphysical teleological societies: because in 
these societies individuals are aware that “[they are] someone’s son or daughter, 
someone else’s cousin or uncle; [that they are] a citizen of this or that city, a 
member of this or that guild or profession; [that they] belong to this clan, that tribe, 
this nation”(33); because in these societies individuals understand that  
  
these are not characteristics that belong to human beings accidentally, to be 
stripped away in order to discover ‘the real me’. They are part of my substance, 
defining partially at least and sometimes wholly my obligations and my duties. 
Individuals inherit a particular space within an interlocking set of social 
relationships; lacking that space, they are nobody, or at best a stranger or an 
outcast.(34) 
  
Macintyre is then worried by the criticisms of metaphysical thought because he is 
still attached to the foundationalist conviction that if we drop foundational teleology 
we lose the possibility of appealing to any telos at all, thus depriving our life of any 
point, of any goal worth living for; we lose our inherited conception of ourselves 
and our place in society, thus breaking into pieces our identity. 
However just as anti-foundationalism does not corrode normativity but only 
internalise the source of normative authority from the God’s eye point of view to 
particular ethnocentric sets of values and beliefs, it also does not withdraw sense 
from the evaluative activity of projecting and prioritising the ends and goals of our 
life, nor does it corrode our personal and social identity. Anti-foundationalists are 
against metaphysical teleology, not against teleology per se. From the anti-
foundationalist standpoint we can still place the ends of our lives in hierarchical 
order, we can still posit overarching goals for our lives, and we can still hold views 
of our personal and social identity with clear conscience. What anti-foundationalists 
deny is that those hierarchies, those ultimate goals, and those identities, are carved 
once and for all for us in a noumenal reality beyond possible revision. For anti-
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foundationalists, realising that there is no limit antecedently given to us which we 
should absolutely abide by is liberating indeed, as this means for them that we are 
now free to change that ordering and prioritising of ends, and thus the shape of our 
self and our (private and public) life, as we regard most appropriate ‘by reasons 
which we judge to be good.’ That is, for anti-foundationalists anti-foundationalism 
enables us to be ‘our own judges’, exactly as Macintyre praises Kant for wishing 
human beings to be; it enables us to respect more fully the equality and freedom of 
our human fellows. It would seem, then, that if Macintyre wishes to stick to Kant’s 
liberal injunction he should embrace an anti-foundationalist conception after all. 
However, a straightforward reading of Macintyre’s overall argument opens itself to 
us, which could make us see how the two political motivations behind Macintyre’s 
contention of the moral degeneration of post-Enlightenment culture – the defence 
of both Kant’s liberal injunction and the communitarian conservative relationship 
between individual and society –, instead of contradicting each other and standing 
on opposite assumptions, would square perfectly with each other. We may, in fact, 
read Macintyre as thinking that the fuller realisation of freedom and equality, and 
thus of a society free from oppressive behaviour and arbitrary abuses of power, is 
possible only from within a traditional theistic and Aristotelian foundationalist 
conception of morality, and that contemporary liberalism would instead betray 
those values because it presupposes an anti-foundationalist conception of 
rationality. We may, that is, read Macintyre as thinking that there is a difference 
between a genuine liberalism, which stands on teleological metaphysical grounds, 
and a fake one, standing on relativist ones.  
This is presumably the correct reading of Macintyre’s argument. Though, this 
genuine liberalism would ultimately dissolve into familiar conservative and 
authoritarian communitarian politics. In fact, the praise of Aristotelian and theistic 
cultures, once divested of its metaphysical motivation, which we have seen 
Macintyre never succeeds in arguing for, ultimately boils down to the praise of the 
moral, political and social conditions that the metaphysical teleology of those 
cultures enables to realise. These are conditions of moral, political and social 
stability, the conditions of a society where everyone knows her place in it and in the 
world, and thus where there is no uncertainty about what everyone’s duties and 
rights are and about what actions are required to perform these duties and 
rights(35); a society where there are no situations of conflict which cannot be 
rationally settled by reference to well defined authoritative standards, and thus 
where normative judgements are called true or false in the same way as factual 
statements are. They are the conditions of a society where the voice of these 
(allegedly metaphysical) objective and impersonal standards, of the ends that would 
confer a true sense to our human life and a true content to our identity, are not 
“interpreted and misinterpreted in terms of the pluralism which threatens to 
submerge us all”(36), as “all too easily” happens instead in contemporary liberal 
societies which “lack of any clear consensus” about evaluative, moral and political 
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matters.(37) And these, whatever their actual content might be, are undoubtedly 
conservative and authoritarian conditions. 
Hence, from an anti-foundationalist standpoint, the resort to teleology turns out to 
be a conservative solution to the failure of foundationalism to come up with a 
neutral framework of rationality that could guarantee the existence of a correct 
resolution to the disagreements between different moral and conceptual traditions. 
Consequently, the key episodes in the history of the alleged degeneration of 
Western moral discourse that Macintyre traces for us turn out to be, not 
philosophical and conceptual episodes, but rather moral, political and social ones. 
They ultimately amount to the disappearance of the kind of closed, conservative 
and authoritarian societies we have just described, plausibly as the result of the 
encounter and clash of different conflicting and incommensurable closed cultures 
and traditions of the same kind; exactly those episodes that eventually made 
Enlightenment philosophers realise that if they wanted to show the superiority of 
one such culture over the others they had to resort to arguments which did not 
presuppose the validity of one theological or Aristotelian metaphysics amongst 
others. 
Yet again, this reading of Macintyre as a conservative foundationalist, which for the 
most part of the book seems to be the most appropriate, does not fit with all that 
Macintyre says. This reading ultimately crumbles when Macintyre moves on to 
consider the limitations of Aristotelian teleology (and, I take it, theological teleology 
too) which he thinks need to be overcome in order to give an adequate account of 
moral discourse. In fact, at this point Macintyre mentions just those two 
characteristics of Aristotelianism (as well as of theology) that make it a 
foundationalist anti-liberal position: that is, its metaphysical biology and the absence 
of an appreciation of conflict as a key source of learning and as a milieu for the 
exercise of virtues.(38) 
This goes against any anti-liberal foundationalist reading, for once we drop the 
metaphysical back up from Aristotelian and theistic teleology, and once we 
recognise the importance of conflict and critical reflection within ourselves and our 
societies for our societies’ and our own cultural enhancement, and thus we 
recognise that we are not trapped within the boundaries of our initial 
communitarian conceptual and moral horizons – as Macintyre in an exemplary way 
does by noticing that “the fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and 
through its membership in communities…does not entail that the self has to accept 
the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community”(39) – then 
we have transformed a foundationalist and conservative communitarian position 
into the anti-foundationalist liberal one that we have depicted in the previous 
chapters. Namely, a position that regards our identity and our conceptions of the 
good as initially shaped by the community in which we grow up, but, nonetheless, 
as always susceptible to all the revisions that we may consider appropriate by our 
personal contingent points of view and by the contingent points of view of a 
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community dedicated to full respect for the freedom and equality of its members; 
and that, yet, does not regard this contingency as a menace either for normativity or 
for liberalism. 
We thus find ourselves facing again the irremediable tension between a liberal and 
an anti-liberal outlook, to which now it is added that between foundationalism and 
anti-foundationalism. The latter tension indeed becomes more and more intense 
and occupies a more central place in Macintyre’s reflections following After Virtue, 
now particularly focused on the issue of relativism. It is in this attempt to resolve 
this latter tension that Macintyre is eventually pushed more and more towards an 
anti-foundationalist liberal position. It is to consider this attempt that I shall now 
turn. 
  
  
  
2. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?: Reasonableness as a liberal solution to the 
failure of foundationalism  
  
Macintyre is led to focus his attention on the issue of relativism because he comes 
to realise, as he writes in the postscript to the second edition of After Virtue, that 
nothing he said in his teleological account of morality “goes any way to show that a 
situation could not arise in which it proved possible to discover no rational way to 
settle the disagreement between two different moral and epistemological traditions, 
so that positive grounds for a relativistic thesis would emerge.”(40) That is, 
Macintyre comes to acknowledge what we have previously noted, that he never 
advanced arguments in support of his belief in the possibility of metaphysical 
teleology and metaphysical objectivity, and thus in support of his belief in the 
epistemological confusion of an anti-foundationalist culture as it is manifested in 
the characteristic interminability of contemporary public moral debate between 
rival arguments. It is in order to offer such an argument against this anti-
foundationalist predicament of rational incommensurability that he turns his 
attention to the issue of relativism, as he identifies that predicament with that of 
relativism. 
Yet, we will see that his attempt is bound to fail from the outset because of an 
irremediable tension within his thought. This tension is the result of an increasing 
anti-metaphysical awareness on Macintyre’s part. We know he has always rejected 
the Enlightenment foundationalist attempts. Though, in After Virtue he was still 
confident in his opposition to the post-Nietzchean rejection of all foundational 
philosophy on the assumption of the possibility of metaphysical teleology. Now this 
confidence seems to have definitely crumbled. Macintyre seems to have realised 
that to abandon the metaphysical biology behind Aristotelian (and theistic) 
teleology means to abandon metaphysical thought altogether; to be left with an anti-
foundationalist (internist) conception of teleology like the one I have depicted 
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above. That is, Macintyre finally seems to have taken on board the pragmatist 
lesson shared by Rorty and Putnam, that, if within a particular teleological 
conception evaluative judgements can be called true and false exactly like factual 
statements can be so called, there cannot be metaphysical arguments which will 
guarantee the truth of a particular teleological conception over the others. 
However, although holding this anti-foundationalist conviction, he still maintains an 
opposition to the predicament of the incommensurability of rival practices and 
traditions and of the interminability of the debate between such incommensurable 
practices and traditions, which he identifies with relativism. This opposition causes 
the irremediable tension by which Macintyre’s later thought is torn. Macintyre, in 
fact, aims to find a way out from the relativist predicament while keeping hold of an 
anti-foundationalist perspective, without realising that that predicament is the 
unavoidable consequence of that perspective. Macintyre, that is, tries to find a 
balance between anti-foundationalism and anti-relativism, without realising that the 
relativism he has in mind is not the corrosive ‘anything-goes’ one against which 
Rorty and Putnam argue, but innocuously is anti-foundationalism itself. He thus 
finds himself torn between anti-foundationalism and anti-anti-foundationalism. 
And, as we will see, it is in trying to resolve this tension that, despite what he thinks, 
he is eventually led to embrace anti-foundational liberalism, as he comes to realise 
that the only way to resolve the impasse within reason, the impasse between 
different traditions and practices of rationality, remaining within an anti-
foundationalist standpoint, is to abandon epistemology for ethics, to embrace a full 
blooded anti-foundationalism and replace foundational rationality for liberal 
reasonableness; although, of course, he does not quite put things like that. 
We can take as the starting point for our clarification the way in which in Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? Macintyre presents the tension between anti-
foundationalism and anti-relativism, to the solution of which most part of that book 
was dedicated. In the introductory chapter we are presented with the following 
question: 
  
Is there some mode of understanding which could find no place in the 
Enlightenment’s vision of the world by means of which the conceptual and 
theoretical resources can be provided for reuniting conviction concerning such 
matters as justice on the one hand and rational enquiry and justification on the 
other?(41) 
  
The Enlightenment’s vision is the familiar foundationalist one which aimed “to 
provide for debate in public realm standards and methods of rational justification 
by which alternative courses of action in every sphere of life could be adjudged just 
or unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened or unenlightened,...[which aimed] to 
appeal to principles undeniable by any rational person and therefore independent 
of all those social and cultural particularities which the Enlightenment thinkers took 
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to be the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular times and places.”(42) 
The idea was ‘to displace authority and tradition with reason’. Though, Macintyre 
remarks, the increasing inability to agree as to what reason commanded, “as to what 
precisely those principles were which would be found undeniable by all rational 
persons”, contributed to the increasing lack of trust towards the possibility to attain 
the Enlightenment’s ‘ideal of rational justification.’ This failure of the 
Enlightenment foundationalist project brought about “the inability within our 
culture to unite conviction and rational justification.”(43) “We thus inhabit in a 
culture”, concludes Macintyre, “in which an inability to arrive at agreed rationally 
justifiable conclusions on the nature of justice and practical rationality coexists with 
appeals by contending social groups to sets of rival and conflicting convictions 
unsupported by rational justification.”(44) Questions concerning justice and 
rationality have thus become a matter “not for rational enquiry, but rather for the 
assertion and counterassertion of alternative and incompatible sets of 
premises.”(45) 
This is the same state of confusion that in After Virtue Macintyre attributes to 
contemporary liberal moral debate; and he still believes in the association between 
anti-foundationalism -he would say relativism- and liberalism. He still believes that 
“a liberal order is one in which…debate is necessarily barren…and nonrational 
persuasion displaces rational argument”, “since no overall theory of human good is 
to be regarded as justified.”(46) But, now, he has a different idea of the ways and 
resources that can enable us to restore moral order, “to rationally resolve the 
difference between rival and incompatible traditions”(47), and “substituting, for a 
politics in which the exercise of power is unmediated by rationality, a politics in 
which the exercise of power is both mediated and tempered by appeal to standards 
of rational justification independent of the particularism of the contending 
parties.”(48) These resources, as before, we need to recover from the obscurantism 
of the Enlightenment reaction against tradition. But now, instead of consisting of a 
return to conservative metaphysical teleology, they lie in  
  
a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception according 
to which the standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are part 
of a history in which they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the 
limitations of and provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within the 
history of that same tradition.(49)  
  
I do think that this conception of rationality really represents that alternative mode 
of understanding capable of resolving the post-Enlightenment tension between 
tradition and reason, between anti-foundationalism and anti-relativism, without 
falling back on the metaphysical and conservative aspects of the classical 
Aristotelian and theological teleological scheme. But I also think that Macintyre has 
not succeeded in eliminating completely these aspects from his thought. These 
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aspects still retain a place in his thought in what Macintyre hopes to get from his 
tradition-embodied conception rationality. That is, I think there is a discrepancy, of 
which Macintyre is unaware, between what his conception of rationality amounts to 
and what is implied by his idea of the relativist predicament that that conception is 
supposed to enable us to resolve. In particular, I do not think that his tradition-
embodied conception of rationality is the conception of rationality needed for what 
Macintyre intends as the rational resolution of the difference between rival and 
incompatible traditions and for a politics in which the exercise of power is both 
mediated and tempered by appeal to neutral standards of rational justification. I 
think that Macintyre, without realising it, would like to have a metaphysical (and 
conservative) notion of rationality and truth after all, while all he actually says about 
rationality does not point beyond an anti-foundationalist liberal conception. 
In order to illustrate my contention, and thus to evaluate Macintyre’s project of 
overcoming the impasse within reason, we need to see exactly what is involved in 
both his description of the “tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive” 
rationality and in the sense of rationality needed in order to resolve the situation of 
assertion and counterassertion which Macintyre feels must be resolved, and thinks 
his tradition-embodied rationality can resolve, and see if they match. 
Let us start from the latter point. What does Macintyre intend for “rationality” 
when he speaks of “rational resolution of difference”, of “rational mediation of 
power”, and of “reuniting conviction and rational enquiry and justification”? What 
does he mean for “rational justification”? What does he think an adequate account 
of rationality should account for? What does Macintyre think the relativist 
predicament to be overcome consists of? 
He regards his tradition-embodied conception of rationality to give the resources 
for overcoming just those situations of impasse between conflicting traditions facing 
each other through the assertion and counterassertion of their rival standpoints that 
an anti-foundationalist account of rationality such as Rorty’s and Putnam’s regards 
as a possible outcome of any confrontation between different traditions. Thus, 
although Macintyre acknowledges “the de facto ineliminability of fundamental 
disagreement between persons of different standpoints all of whom appear equally 
capable of rational judgement”(50), he is also keen to specify that from this fact  
  
it does not follow, as we might suppose if we did concede the last word to 
relativism, that we are thereby condemned to or imprisoned within our own 
particular standpoint, able to controvert that of others only by appealing to 
standards which already presuppose the standpoint of our own prejudice.(51)  
  
It does not follow “that all fundamental rational justification can only be internal to, 
and relative to the standards of, each particular standpoint”(52), that “each 
standpoint is locked into its own mode of rational justification and into the 
conceptual scheme to which that mode gives expression.”(53) “On fundamental 
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matters”, he says, “the existence of continuing disagreements should not lead us to 
suppose that there are not adequate resources available for the rational resolution 
of such disagreements.”(54) 
It is true that these passages, by themselves, are not enough to present a different 
conception of rationality from the anti-foundationalist one as presented by Rorty 
and Putnam, as this also acknowledges that when we encounter people with whom 
it does not seem possible to reach a point of agreement we are not necessarily 
relegated to an encounter of deaf assertion and counterassertion; that situations of 
radical disagreement do not prevent us from trying to listen better to the others, to 
understand or even to learn from them, and eventually end up with a point of 
agreement even different from our initial starting points. However, while anti-
foundationalists think that these considerations convey nothing more than a 
conception of rationality as a moral attitude we may, or may not, choose to have 
before situations of disagreement, the attitude recommended by liberals of trying 
for a de facto resolution of disagreement respecting each others freedom and 
equality, Macintyre seems to be willing to give us something more, a de jure 
guarantee of a possible resolution to fundamental disagreements ‘that is not internal 
to, and relative to the standards of one’s own particular standpoint.’(55) 
This is made apparent, for example, when in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
he moves on to explain the sense in which “the relativist challenge rests upon a 
denial that rational debate between and rational choice among rival traditions is 
possible.”(56) There he asserts that this denial amounts to the conclusion that 
  
if the only available standards of rationality are those made available by and within 
traditions, then no issue between contending traditions is rationally decidable. To 
assert or to conclude this rather than that can be rational relative to the standards of 
some particular tradition but not rational as such. There can be no rationality as 
such.(57) 
  
Passages like this sound like a direct critic of any position like Putnam’s and Rorty’s 
that internalises the normative vocabulary of the different particular concrete 
traditions; and, accordingly, it sounds like a critic of any anti-metaphysical position. 
For, if a resolution or moderation of a disagreement between incompatible 
standpoints needs to be independent from what the particular conflicting 
standpoints regard as a rational resolution and a rational moderation by the 
standards of rationality internal to themselves, in order to be legitimately 
considered as rational, as Macintyre seems to be asserting, then the concept of 
rationality becomes barely distinguishable from that pointed out to us by 
metaphysics and the Enlightenment’s aversion towards tradition. 
We find this same metaphysical intent when Macintyre, as he did in After Virtue, 
points out to the relativist that “the protagonists of those standpoints which generate 
large and systematic disagreements…are never themselves relativist”(58), since 
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“their claims are of a kind which require unqualified justification…they are claims 
to truth.”(59) This time, though, Macintyre tries to explain exactly what is involved 
in making truth claims, and how this would go against the relativist predicament of 
the interminability of fundamental disagreements. Making a claim to truth for 
Macintyre involves two things. First, “it commits those who uphold it to a non-
relativist conception of rational justification, to a belief that there must be somehow 
or other adequate standards of rational justification, which are not the standards 
internal to this or that standpoint, but are the standards of rational justification as 
such. Secondly, just because this is so, making a claim to truth opens up the 
possibility that the claim may fail”(60), and this would go directly against the 
relativist, as she (the relativist) (allegedly) believes that 
  
just because the standards to which the partisans of each [standpoint] appeal are to 
a significant degree internal to each standpoint, any possibility of something that 
could be recognised as a refutation of one’s standpoint by that of another is 
precluded... But when one notices that the claim made by each contending party is 
a claim to truth, this inference is put in question.(61) 
  
Here, once again, positions of the sort of Putnam’s internalism and Rorty’s 
ethnocentrism, which hold a conception of rational justification for which there are 
not standards of rational justification as such but only standards internal to this or 
that standpoint, and thus hold that there cannot be a non-prejudicial confrontation 
between fundamentally different standpoints, are identified with relativism. It is true 
that just as these positions do not entail that ‘we are trapped in solipsistic hells’, 
‘trapped within our monad or our language’(62), they also do not close up the 
possibility that the claims to truth made on the basis of those standards internal to 
our tradition may fail, and that something could be recognised as a refutation of 
our standpoint. In fact, the debate that has involved Rorty and Putnam in the last 
twenty years or so I believe has shown us that it is possible to advance an anti-
foundationalism that accepts and regards as extremely important the idea of 
reforms of our thoughts and practices, and that this acceptance is closely related to 
the recognition of the ideal, transcending, character of truth, and of normativity in 
general. But it also has shown us that this transcendence does not point towards a 
notion of truth as such, independent of any standpoint. From their anti-
foundationalist perspective the transcendence of truth is equivalent to its 
irreducibility, a characteristic shared with all normative notions, and expressed by 
the cautionary use we make of such notions when we say, for instance, that a belief 
is wholly justified but not true. But this irreducibility and this cautionary use does 
not point beyond all justification, all traditions of justification. Even if “truth is 
independent of justification here and now, [it is] not independent of all 
justification”(63) maintained Putnam. And, similarly, for Rorty “the entire force of 
the cautionary use of ‘true’ is just to point out that we can never exclude the 
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possibility that some better audience might exist, or come to exist, to whom a belief 
that is justifiable to us would not be justifiable”(64); “that somebody may come up 
with a better idea...that there is always room for improved belief, since new 
evidence, or new hypotheses, or a whole new vocabulary, may come along.”(65) 
Though, Macintyre seems instead to mean the independence of truth from 
justification in a metaphysical sense. Thus, for example, his contention against 
Putnam’s theory of truth as idealisation of rational justification is that, from his 
internalist position according to which each contending tradition in fundamental 
disagreement has internal to itself its own mode of rational justification, “what 
constitutes an idealisation of rational justification will also be specific and 
idiosyncratic to the standpoint of that particular tradition”(66), and that, therefore, 
Putnam’s idealisation cannot guarantee a resolution of fundamental disagreement, 
but would propose again such disagreement within itself. Putnam’s ‘idealisation of 
rational justification’ would not be an adequate account of rationality because it 
“has never been given an adequate content”, a content that would tell us when we 
have reached that ultimate perspective-free terminus of enquiry. 
However, Putnam never intended to give us such a metaphysical content; he just 
wanted to account for the possibility of normative authority once denied the project 
of placing that authority on metaphysical grounds outside all traditions. As Rorty 
noticed from his ethnocentric perspective, “idealized rational acceptability” can 
mean nothing else other than “rational acceptability to an ideal community”, and 
“given that no such community is going to have a God’s-Eye view, this ideal 
community cannot be anything more than us at our best.” And this means that, 
although truth is not reducible to the standards of rationality of any single tradition, 
there is no possibility of so detaching truth from rational justification so as to be 
able to use “true” transcending the particularisms of ‘any merely local standpoints’. 
For pragmatists this transcendence would deprive the notion of truth of the context 
for its application. For Macintyre, instead, the opposite is true: “where there is no 
possibility of thus transcending such limitations, there is no application for the 
notion of truth.”(67) 
Where Macintyre’s metaphysical interpretation of truth’s independence from 
rational justification within a tradition is made most manifest is in the description of 
the conception of truth that he thinks is needed in order “to block the inference 
from the fact about fundamental disagreement to the relativist’s conclusion.” This 
is, in fact, the Aristotelian conception of truth as adaequatio intellectus ad rem, 
interpreted in a way which is very much reminiscent of the conception of truth 
presupposed by Williams’ ‘absolute conception of the world’, and Nagel’s ‘view 
from nowhere.’(68) “It is towards this condition of enquiry (adaequatio intellectus 
ad rem]”, says Macintyre in fact,  
  
that the mind moves in its enquiries, its telos provided by its conception of the 
achievement of just such a relation of adequacy to what is. A mind which has 
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achieved such a relationship will have overcome those limitations of perspective 
and of cognitive resources which previously restricted it to judgements as to what 
seems to be the case here and now under the limitations of some particular local 
set of circumstances.(69) 
  
The metaphysical reading of truth’s transcendence is made explicit when, after 
having recognised that “what impressed the relativist’s attention, [the de facto 
ineliminability of fundamental disagreement] is important”, Macintyre gives the 
following formulation of our initial problem of finding a resolution to the post-
enlightenment tension between anti-foundationalism and anti-relativism: 
  
Is it possible to bring into coherent relationship, and, if so, how, a recognition that 
all rational justification of particular moral standpoints is internal to those 
standpoints, and an elucidation of the claim to truth universally or almost 
universally advanced -implicitly or explicitly- by the protagonists of each of those 
standpoints, a claim which involves appeal to rational justification as such, that is, to 
some mode of justification which transcends the limitations of particular 
standpoints?(70) 
  
By continuously referring to rationality as such we can confidently say that, while 
the anti-foundationalists, not excluding the de facto possibility of reaching a 
solution for fundamental disagreements, deny any a priori guarantee for the 
possibility of such a solution, Macintyre seems to be willing to furnish the basis for 
just such an a priori guarantee, and thus to identify with its denial the relativist 
predicament. That is, the conception of rationality which Macintyre refers to when 
he tells us what we need to defend our thought and practices against relativism -
namely, the rational resolution of disagreements, the rational mediation of the 
politics of power and the reunion of conviction and rational justification- seems to 
be exactly that of a neutral framework of thought independent of the contingency 
and particularisms of the local traditions we inhabit, which very much reminds us 
of the Enlightenment’s vision of rationality whose high expectations leads to the 
sort of relativism that is really to be feared. This is the radical relativism of the 
‘anything goes’ kind and not the internalisation of normativity to our practices of 
justification operated by Rorty and Putnam, which indeed only can save us from 
corrosive scepticism once the metaphysical framework of thought has been 
abandoned. 
Yet, this very same conception of rationality and framework of thought is the one 
that in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Macintyre claims to have been denying 
throughout the book. Thus, he says, for example, that the conclusion of his 
discussion of rationality embodied in tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive 
enquiry is that “it is an illusion to suppose that there is some neutral standing 
ground, some locus for rationality as such, which can afford rational resources 
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sufficient for enquiry independent of all traditions”(71); that “we have learned that 
we cannot ask and answer those questions [questions about justice and rationality] 
from a standpoint external to all tradition, that the resources of adequate rationality 
are made available to us only in and through traditions.”(72) He also claims, 
contradicting his previous identification of liberalism with anti-foundationalism, that 
the failure of the project of liberalism, 
  
the fact that liberalism does not provide a neutral-tradition-independent ground 
from which a verdict may be passed upon the rival claims of conflicting traditions in 
respect of practical rationality and justice, but turns itself to be just one more such 
tradition…provides the strongest reason that we can actually have for asserting that 
there is no such neutral ground that there is no place for appeals to a practical-
rationality-as-such or a justice-as-such to which all rational persons would by their 
very rationality be compelled to give their allegiance. There is instead only the 
practical-rationality-of-this-or-that-tradition and the justice-of-this-or-that-
tradition.(73)  
  
Besides, although he believes that “implicit in the rationality of [our] enquiry there 
is indeed a conception of a final truth, that is to say, a relationship of the mind to its 
objects which would be wholly adequate in respect of the capacities of that mind”, 
he acknowledges that  
  
any conception of that state as one in which the mind could by its own powers 
know itself as thus adequately informed is ruled out; The Absolute Knowledge of 
the Hegelian system is from this tradition-constituted standpoint a chimaera. No 
one at any stage can ever rule out the future possibility of their present beliefs and 
judgements being shown to be inadequate in a variety of ways.(74) 
  
This last passage is in open contradiction to his metaphysical reading of the 
transcendence of truth. In fact it makes of this transcendence as much a 
criterionless idealisation as that in the terms of which Putnam and Rorty construe 
the irreducibility typical of all normative notions, thus acknowledging that it never 
makes us step outside the contingency of traditions towards a point of view from 
which we could settle de jure all kind of disagreement. 
In order to release this tension between a foundationalist reaction to the anti-
foundationalist impasse within reason – which Macintyre identifies with relativism 
and liberalism – and an allegiance to anti-foundationalism itself – which at other 
times he instead opposes to liberalism – it is necessary to consider the exact nature 
of the resources that his tradition-embodied conception of rationality offers us as a 
means for overcoming the relativist predicament, and to distinguish what those 
resources entail from what he regards as the requirement for any adequate account 
of rationality. We will thus be able to appreciate the real import of his defence of 
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tradition-embodied rationality, that is, a defence of a self-critical, fallibilistic, and 
conversable attitude open to the suggestions and insights of other conflicting 
traditions as key for the reform and enhancement of our intellectual and practical 
traditions. 
Macintyre presents to us the resources that he believes his tradition-embodied 
conception rationality offers us against relativism by considering a particular kind of 
occurrence which he thinks is ignored by relativists, that of “epistemological crisis.” 
This is that kind of critical situation that a particular tradition, with its own 
distinctive theses and arguments, but also problems and difficulties in terms of 
whose resolution its progress should be measured by, might encounter in the 
course of its development; a situation in which that tradition “appears by its own 
standards, to have degenerated”(75), and “by its own standards of progress, to have 
ceased to make progress”(76), so that, “at a certain point in the history of such 
attempts to deal with such problems it can become plain that they are not only 
persistent, but intractable, and irremediably so.”(77) “Characteristically at this stage 
contradictions appear that cannot be resolved within the particular tradition’s own 
conceptual framework.”(78) “All attempts to deploy the imaginative and inventive 
resources which the adherents of the tradition can provide may flounder.”(79) 
“And what the adherents of such a tradition may have to learn is that they lack the 
resources to explain its own failing condition.”(80) 
For Macintyre a solution to these situations of epistemological crisis requires, 
  
the invention or discovery of new concepts and the framing of some new types of 
theory which meet three highly exacting requirements: First, this in some ways 
radically new and conceptually enriched scheme...must furnish a resolution to the 
problems which had previously proved intractable. Second, it must also provide an 
explanation of just what it was that rendered the tradition, before it had acquired 
these new resources, sterile or incoherent or both. And third, these first two tasks 
must be carried out in a way which exhibits continuity of the new conceptual and 
theoretical structures with the shared belief in terms of which the tradition of 
enquiry had been defined up to this point.(81) 
  
And an important role in the overcoming of these crises he regards to be played by 
the other, previously conflicting, traditions. 
  
For the adherents of a tradition which is now in this state of fundamental and 
radical crisis may at this point encounter in a new way the claims of some particular 
rival tradition... When they have understood the beliefs of the alien tradition, they 
may find themselves compelled to recognise that within this other tradition it is 
possible to construct from the concepts and theories peculiar to it what they were 
unable to provide from their own conceptual and theoretical resources, a cogent 
and illuminating explanation -cogent and illuminating, that is, by their own 
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standards- of why their own intellectual tradition had been unable to solve its 
problems.(82) 
  
Macintyre’s main contention is that the dynamic of the occurrence and resolution 
of epistemological crises proves that “a tradition can be rationally discredited by 
and in the light of appeal to its very own standards of rationality”(83), and that this 
would show that relativism flounders, because the fact that a tradition can vindicate 
its rational superiority over its rivals “is the possibility which the relativist challenge 
has failed to envisage.”(84) 
Yet, we should ask: is it true that relativism, as conceived of by Macintyre -as the 
thesis that we can apply the normative vocabulary only within a particular tradition-, 
fails to envisage the possibility that the resolution of epistemological crisis show us, 
i.e. that a tradition can vindicate its rational superiority over its rivals? 
The only way in which such relativism – which coincides with anti-foundationalism- 
would not be able to show the rational superiority of one tradition over another is 
in the foundational sense of ‘rational superiority’ that refers to an a priori neutral 
framework of rationality. But, does the argument from epistemological crises point 
to this framework and thus refute the kind of internalisation of truth and rationality 
within the different contingent tradition operated by Rorty and Putnam? Or does it 
not rather only point out that ‘we can never exclude the possibility that some better 
us might exist’, as Rorty would say, ‘since new evidence, or new hypotheses, or a 
whole new vocabulary, may come along’? 
It seems to me that Macintyre’s argument shows only the latter internalist sense in 
which there can be rational progress and improvement. In fact, what it shows is 
only that a tradition can be rationally discredited by appealing to its very own 
standards of rationality, and replaced by a rival tradition shown to be rationally 
superior by those same standards. Since the standards by which a tradition resolves 
its epistemological crises are its own ones, showing that a tradition can resolve such 
a crisis by appealing to the resources of another tradition does not show that we can 
resolve the problem posed by fundamental disagreements about the very standards 
of rationality. What has been shown is simply what Rorty and Putnam 
acknowledge, namely, that the latter tradition scores better than the former, that the 
latter tradition represents a better version of the former, and better in terms of the 
standards of the former tradition. 
The resolution of an epistemological crisis seems, thus, to be just a solution, even if 
a radical one, to the problems internal to a tradition afforded from within that same 
tradition. For, if the standards of rationality by which we judge the resolution of an 
epistemological crisis occurring within our own tradition (whether the resolution 
comes from an already existing different tradition or from a new one created by our 
imagination) are those belonging to our own very tradition, then, there cannot be a 
radical discontinuity between different successive stages of our tradition. This was 
after all what the third requirement for a resolution of an epistemological crisis 
Macintyre’s Tensions 
 
 151
recommended to us –i.e. continuity with the belief of the tradition. This does not 
mean that a tradition which has gone through several epistemological crises in the 
course of its history might not end up, by a continuous process of slight 
replacement of its fundamental standards and beliefs similar to that of Neurath’s 
seamen fixing their boat afloat, holding a system of values, beliefs, and standards of 
rationality, entirely different from that which it started out with. But, even so, we 
would always be placed within some tradition or other with its local standard of 
rationality. 
Besides, we would not have escaped from contingency even if the standards by 
which a tradition admits its inferiority to another rival tradition were not its own 
standards, but those of the rival or of a further different tradition. In fact we would 
just have a situation in which a change of mind is brought about “through the 
exercise of philosophical and moral imagination”(85), as Macintyre himself says 
replying to the question “how is it possible that someone whose moral beliefs and 
practices are both informed and limited by the concepts and standards of her or his 
own particular point of view could have acquired the ability to understand her or 
his own standpoint from some external and rival vantage point?”(86) And 
imagination is not exactly what is needed to guarantee the availability of a neutral 
framework of rationality as such. It involves narrative redescription and not rational 
argumentation. 
Hence, the consideration of epistemological crises does not move us a step away 
from ethnocentrism. It does not offer an argument for the possibility of arriving at a 
de jure resolution of all possible disagreements between conflicting traditions. The 
only neutral ground we may ever find is a ground of contingent agreement, of 
agreement within a particular tradition; and what Macintyre’s account of tradition-
embodied rationality and his discussion of epistemological crises ultimately shows 
us -despite what Macintyre may think- are exactly those resources available to us for 
trying to reach this contingent neutral ground, this de facto agreement. And these, 
now we are able to see, are not epistemological resources but moral, political, and 
imaginative ones. They are those attitudes of conversability, of readiness to fairly 
consider matters from other points of views and to put in question our own 
standpoint -for the full exercise of which a good dose of imagination can be 
essential- typical of a fallibilistic, democratic and pluralist tradition. 
It is by appealing to these attitudes that Macintyre ultimately argues against both 
“those post-Nietzschean theories according to which rational argument, enquiry, 
and practice always express some interest of power and are indeed the masks worn 
by some will to power”(87), and those contemporary anti-relativist theories which 
share the Enlightenment’s “plainly self-interested belief that whenever we succeed 
in discovering the rationality of other and alien cultures and traditions, by making 
their behaviour intelligible and by understanding their languages, what we will also 
discover is that in essentials they are just like us...thereby making more plausible 
those theories which identify every form of rationality with some form of 
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contending power.”(88) “What can liberate rationality from this identification”, he 
claims, 
is precisely an acknowledgement, only possible from within a certain kind of 
tradition, that rationality requires a readiness on our part to accept, and indeed to 
welcome a possible future defeat of the forms of theory and practice in which it has 
up till now been taken to be embodied within our own tradition, at the hands of 
some alien and perhaps as yet largely unintelligible tradition of thought and 
practice.(89) 
  
Thus, at the end of his polemic against anti-foundationalism and liberalism, 
Macintyre seems to have finally come to converge on the same anti-foundationalist 
liberal position shared by Rorty and Putnam. This is the position according to 
which that that can enable us to overcome the limitations and defects of 
ethnocentrism – e.g. the possible situation of deaf, conservative and authoritarian 
assertion and counter-assertion of our conceptions and practices – can only be a 
self-critical, open-minded, imaginative and tolerant ethnocentrism, an ethnocentric 
endorsement of a conception of rationality as reasonableness, as imaginative, 
fallibilistic and tolerant openness towards our fellow human beings regarded as free 
and equal persons. 
However, Macintyre’s inveterate resistance to abandoning a foundationalist 
approach to rationality makes him still inclined to think that there is something 
more that we can and should do in order to overcome the ethnocentric 
predicament and defend ourselves against its possible illiberal consequences. He 
still appears to think that the endorsement of liberal reasonableness is, and should 
be, subordinated to a correct analysis of the concept of rationality. It is rationality, 
“qua rationality”(90), in fact, that he thinks requires a readiness on our part to be 
fallibilistic and liberal. He still tends to think, that is, as the supporters of the 
Enlightenment’s foundational project do, that practical, political and moral issues 
are subordinated to epistemological ones, and that therefore the defence of those 
fallibilistic and liberal attitudes should depend, not on a primary pragmatic, political 
and moral choice, but on an adequate analysis of truth and rationality, an analysis 
that would urge us to do what Macintyre himself regards at other times impossible, 
that is to transcend all the particularisms of the contingent local traditions we 
inhabit and to endorse the liberal practice of undistorted communication as the 
best means to reach that impartial standpoint. That he thinks so is shown by his 
endorsement of the Platonic conviction that “the argument against the tyrant and 
the argument against relativized predicates of truth and justification require the 
same premises”, that “it is only in those forms of human relationship in which it is 
possible to appeal to impersonal standards of judgement, neutral between 
competing claims that the possibility opens up of unmasking and dethroning 
arbitrary exercise of power, tyrannical power within communities and imperialist 
power between communities.”(91) 
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(88)  Ibid. The polemic against contemporary anti-relativist theories is here directly 
against Davidson’s criticism of conceptual relativism and against those ethnocentric 
and internalist solutions to relativism, like Rorty’s and Putnam’s, in which 
Davidson’s ‘charitable’ arguments plays a central role. Thus Macintyre says: “The 
danger of contemporary anti-relativism is that it suggests that what is in fact a 
contingent social condition whose limitation it is important for us to overcome is in 
fact a necessary condition of rational social existence. For anti-relativism pictures us 
first as necessarily inhabiting our own conceptual scheme, our own 
Weltanshauung, and second as necessarily acquiring whatever understanding we 
may process of the conceptual schemes and Weltanshauungen of others by a 
process of translation so conceived that any intelligible rendering of the concepts 
and beliefs of the others must represent them as in all central respects similar to 
our own.” ‘Relativism, Power and Philosophy’, p.197. This can be considered a 
correct characterization of the anti-foundationalist approach I have delineated. Yet, 
Macintyre’s accusation that this kind of anti-relativism is nothing but ethnocentric 
imperialism does not hold, because, as Macintyre rightly observed, Davidson never 
traced the limits between the beliefs we can and those we cannot put in question 
without compromising our capacity for understanding, and thus our capacity for 
understanding the others. Exactly because Davidson never traced those limits his 
argument does not put any precise limit to the extent to which we can step into 
others people’s shoes and give an intelligible rendering of their concepts and beliefs 
without representing them as basically similar to our own. Davidson’s -intentional 
or unintentional- silence on this crucial matter allows his argument to be used in 
the way Putnam and Rorty use it. They resort to it in order to reassure us of our 
contact with the external world and of the normative force of our thought once we 
have dropped any metaphysical standpoint, by claiming that we cannot even make 
sense of the thought that the whole of our beliefs could be wrong, without at the 
same time having to fall back into deaf and blind conservatism and imperialism and 
thus to exclude the recognition of diversity. In fact, the extent to which the 
common ground we must presuppose as being shared with other people in order 
to recognise them as intelligible and rational human beings and to prevent the loss 
of a common world, and thus the extent of our capacity to understand diversity, is 
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not given any determined limit by the anti-relativist epistemological argument itself, 
but is left to the deficiency or ingenuity of our imagination and to our good will of 
trying to understand others and their different ways of dealing with the world. 
These are also the resources we have seen that Macintyre himself believes we can 
ever have at our disposal for overcoming epistemological crisis. As we have already 
said, ethnocentrism is neither conservatism nor imperialism; it is not a moral or 
political position at all. It simply says that, since there is no metaphysical order of 
things we should be true to, the correct moral stance to endorse is left to our own 
considered reflection. 
(89)  Ibid., pp.201-202. The emphasis is mine.  
(90)  Ibid., p.201.  
(91) Ibid., pp.191-192.  
 
